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This paper investigates how Schleiermacher’s universal hermeneutics can be 
considered as a better alternative to both, German rationalist aesthetics as 
pioneered by Christian Wolff, and Kant’s transcendental idealism, to the 
extent of overcoming the problematics of rule-following. A general account of 
the necessity of a universal hermeneutics and its meaning from historical 
practices of exegeses is given. This is then followed by the account of rule-
following in the tradition of both German rationalist aesthetics and Kant’s 
transcendental idealism with latter as expounded in Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason. The investigation is comparative and descriptive. The purpose of this 
study is to discuss the hermeneutic possibilities in research methodologies for 
human sciences. 
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1. Introduction  
Hermeneutics, construed as the art of interpretation, has long existed 
before its incorporation in philosophy with its comparatively more significant 
traditional sense being legal, philological, literary and Biblical (Hirsch, 1967, 
p. vii). Its appearance in philosophical discourse can be traced as early as 
Plato’s dialogues, where he spoke of hermenea, the etymological origin of 
which was traced from the Greek word Hermes –the Greek messenger god 
(Plato, 1997, pp. 125-126 (407e)). Although there has been some disagreement 
among the Doxographers whether such a genealogy is truly informative, it 
does deliver the crux in context of the job of the hermeneut as a messenger 
between gods and humans, alluding to the ever-present inherent possibility of 
concealed meaning and misunderstanding or confusions, the natural or pre-
philosophical preconditions of the very conception of the problem that the art 
of interpretation –as technē hermēneutikē, tries to solve by virtue of regional 
exegesis corresponding to the class of text involved. Thus, as Ricoeur himself 
remarked, readings of the Greek myths for Stoics involved rules of 
interpretations primarily inspired by the then developed physics and ethics, 
which were different from reading of Torah for Hebrews and the Bible for 
Christians (Ricouer, 1989, p. 4). In almost every situation, the exegete had to 
cope with multiple possibilities of meaning and come up with an interpretation 
that could incorporate historical and cultural distance in such a way that could 
avoid relativism and is able to successfully help the interlocutor –including the 
interpreter himself both as an author or as a reader, articulate the text into his 
own world and make sense of himself as its dative. For instance, Augustine’s 
‘confessions’ Book-I helps its reader construe the symbols of ideal perfections, 
both divine and their human exemplars from classic Greek and Roman 
literature which inspired an individual acculturated accordingly to act and 
respond in a particular way, as mere ‘wines of errors’ poured into words 
(Augustine, 1912, pp. 47-49); thereby preparing the reader, through what lied 
ahead, to consider the writer as the human exemplar of the divine perfection 
signified by Christ. This made it the piece of not mere confessions, but rather 
at this point, the interpretation of signs of pagan culture as spiritual mutilations 
inflicted upon what is good in humanity, thereby compelling its reader to make 
sense of himself under the light of the way the writer led his life.  
This meant that the problem of interpretation that initially and 
conventionally involved ‘what the text means?’ and its methodological 
determination via ‘how meaning of a particular text becomes possible?’ was 
founded on a more profound problematic of the very act of understanding in 
the most general sense where understanding could be considered as a most 
primordial human capacity responsible for ordinary grasping of everyday-
life’s challenges in terms of signs and significances of moral, political, 
personal or spiritual relevance. Thus the question had to be shifted from above 
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local interpretive problematics to ‘how understanding is possible?’ –the 
Verstehenfrage, that could give rise to a possibility of theorizing such 
interpretive practices towards a general hermeneutics. The aim of this 
hermeneutics would be to work out the rule-boundness of the faculty of 
understanding as interpretation. On the other hand, such instances of 
interpretation exemplify that an interpretive act is not a mere re-presentation of 
something, as if there is some fixed substratum which the interpreter is trying 
to aim at –as in case of attempts to resolve an ambiguity or confusion in a 
message with a view that there is something like a singular intention beneath 
the message waiting to get discovered. But rather every discursive act is 
interpretive to the extent that it presents ‘as-saying’-something-of-something; 
where the first ‘something’ can be thought to be the ‘saying’ with the second 
‘something’ being the reality –its reference or noema1. Consequently, 
interpretation is not just overcoming of confusion that might have crept in but 
is the very presentation of its reference. For Ricoeur, this was already realized 
as early as when Aristotle wrote his ‘Peri Hermēneias’ where he spoke of 
discourse as interpretation of reality via meaningful expression without any 
intermediary substrate –e.g. impressions from things themselves (Ricouer, 
1989, p. 4). Thus, the intentional direction of meaning-intention with 
phenomenological underpinnings becomes clear. Discourse as an 
interpretation is always directed towards its noematic correlate, i.e. the world, 
as a modification of givenness of signitive kind which –one learns from 
phenomenology, intrinsically structures the interpreter as its dative through 
syntactical devices e.g. shifters in linguistics (Ricoeur, 1979, pp. 12-13). In 
fact, once we realize text as discourse fixed through writing, the problem of 
interpretation and signitive intention seems to become essentially correlated. 
This helps bridge the gap between phenomenology and a general 
hermeneutics, where the latter becomes possible only when classical ways of 
conceiving problem of interpretation is given the shift towards general 
problem of understanding or comprehension. This shift had its origin in 
classical interpretive practices –as remarked earlier but was philosophically 
realized around the turn of eighteenth century with the development of 
classical philology. Both Schleiermacher and Dilthey were able to appreciate it 
in context of this latest development (Ricouer, 1989, p. 5).  
                                                     
1 An allusion here to how phenomenology correlates with hermeneutics is both 
informative and relevant. According to traditional historical philosophical scholarship, 
phenomenology enters hermeneutics with Heidegger’s radicalizing of Husserlian 
phenomenology, but I contest that phenomenology is always a presumption of hermeneutics 
and vice versa as soon as hermeneutics tries to become philosophical. My contention is 
supported by (Ricoeur, 2016) and (Figal, 2009). Schleiermacher’s Universal Hermeneutics is 
the first explicit attempt of philosophizing hermeneutics and thus drawing out of 
phenomenological underpinnings is both significant and relevant here. 
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2. Universal Hermeneutics and the Problematics of Rule-Following 
It is with Schleiermacher we find the genesis of this general or universal 
hermeneutics which constitutes itself as the ultimate science where regional or 
local exegetical practices could find their sufficient justification. Such a 
discipline, historically speaking, was an epistemological necessity. Regional 
hermeneutic disciplines are constituted by their respective specialized rules 
which require further rules to justify their applications and no such art could be 
well-founded epistemologically if its foundational questions beg themselves or 
else face the possibility of infinite regress2. For instance, in case of classical 
philology of Alexandrian School pioneered by Zenodotus and Aristarchus, an 
example of such a rule was the principle of analogy-anomaly. According to 
this principle, both conflict of interpretation and the historical authenticity of 
any text depended upon the regularity of language that the author uses in his 
composition. Anything that would defy this regularity would be considered 
anomalous and would thus be rejected as being historically inauthentic3. The 
result of this rule of interpretation was the compilation of the canons of 
classical Greek literature (e.g. Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey and Hesiod’s 
Theogony). However, the rule had an unwarranted assumption –
epistemologically speaking, that the regularity of language expresses a unity of 
consciousness in the form of historical authorial intention. This implied a 
particular philosophy of language and consciousness that was never explicated 
or justified. Thus, an epistemological critique of this particular regional 
hermeneutics would either lead to infinite-regress –for instance if pursued 
                                                     
2 I admit that these are not the only epistemological possibilities. However, in context 
of the debate that was being raged between Die Aufklӓrer (the enlightenment thinkers –Kant, 
Moses Mendelssohn etc.) and the early Romantic and radical reactionaries (e.g. Hamann and 
Jacobi), it was primarily the problem of unconditioned-condition as the final proposition or 
rule that any philosophical system had to posit in order to account the possibility of knowledge 
and the experience of the world. This was then the general intellectual atmosphere of German 
thought around the turn of the 19th century and it was this that was a main impetus behind the 
development of Schleiermacher’s own reflection on both ethics and theology on one hand, and 
hermeneutics on the other. See (Beiser, 1987) for the detail of how German thought around the 
turn of the century was stirred by the Radicalism of Jacobi and Romantic Historicism of 
Hamann in context of the unconditioned-condition, and see (Bowie, 1997) for how these 
issues were important for Schleiermacher. 
3 See (Peck, 1911, pp. 98-117), (Myres, 2014, p. 30ff) and (Dilthey, 1996) for the 
detail of this principle and its historical role in determining the canon of Greek Classics. Also, 
(Verburg, 1998, pp. 20-22, 69ff, 185ff, 219ff) should be cited for a detail of how the concept 
of analogy has been variedly conceptualized throughout in the practices of Biblical exegeses, 
philosophical grammar and philology (which also includes Alexandrian School of classical 
philology). 
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along foundationalist lines4, or else had to satisfy itself with an irreducibility of 
this principle into any further elementary principles or rules. 
Philosophically speaking, a rule may be considered as ‘what determines 
something-as-something’. This is exactly what Kant took to be the point of 
departure for his investigation of searching for the ultimate rules that helps 
render theoretic judgment possible in his transcendental doctrine of 
schematism5. But before Kant and beyond regional hermeneutic practices, 
philosophical reflections on the concept of rule –with historical motivations in 
aesthetic evaluations of the works of art (which obviously includes literary 
works as well), was pursued by the German rationalist tradition, most notably 
the works of Christian Wolff and Alexander Baumgartner. Although 
aesthetically delineated with a strong rationalist lineage, a rule was defined by 
Wolff in his Ontologia, which can be interpreted to be a proposition that 
determines a practice according to reason (Beiser, 2009, p. 13). It has at least 
two major modifications among later aestheticians; instrumental and holistic 
(Ibid. pp. 13-14). Instrumental rule would determine a practice in accordance 
with a particular goal, whereas holistic rule is the very concept of the thing-in-
itself determined as a unity-in-variety. It is the very principle that determines 
the thing as-itself –very much like the Aristotelian formal cause or essence 
determined as a modification of intellect; further inspired by Leibniz’s 
principle of sufficient reason (Ibid pp. 69-70, 134-135). For instance, staging a 
tragic drama would then involve a reasoned account or statement determining 
what it takes or means for a tragedy to be a tragedy holistically. However, this 
by no means determines it rigidly as if it was a natural occurrence determined 
by; say classical mechanics or Newtonian physics. For if the writer wants to 
arouse fear and pity among his audience in order to bring about catharsis –
strictly along the holistic lines determined by Aristotle’s Poetics6, then he 
could follow the corresponding instrumental rule that his protagonist should be 
of an average virtue who would have to suffer some misfortune as a result of a 
mistaken judgment (Beiser, 2009, pp. 13-14). But the praxis itself produces 
countless many ways of confirming to the rule with significant anomalies 
which escapes the sufficient capturing of the praxis through any reasoned 
account as a rule, or the very conformity with the rule itself can eventually turn 
                                                     
4 See (Ryle, 2009, p. 5ff) for a detail of how any foundationalist cognitivist 
epistemology –Descartes’ foundationalist epistemology in particular, leads to an infinite 
regress when it aims to account for any knowledge in terms of cognitive representations. 
5 (Kant, 1998, pp. 232 (A105-106), 268ff (A133-139/B172-179) 273 (A140-
141/B179-181)) 
6 Aristotle’s conception of tragedy involves imitation (mimesis) of human action in 
dramatic poetry that involves arousing pity and fear for the sake of Catharsis. Its structural 
account involves six parts: Plot, Character, Language, Thought, Spectacle and Melody. Pity 
and fear are the qualities which plot produces among audiences, see (Butcher, 1898, pp. 25 
(1450a7-9), 49-50 (1453b-1454a)) for detail. 
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into its defiance.  For instance, within the rationalist tradition, it was soon 
realized that an experience of sublime and the corresponding pleasure that one 
derives from it creates problem for the very possibility of acculturation or 
education that was sought through Catharsis (which was considered to be the 
very justification of usefulness of tragedy for any society)7. It meant that pity 
and fear does not exhaust the repertoire of relevant human emotions to bring 
about the assumed or reasoned effect. On the other hand, traditional rule-
boundness of tragedy –which has to be presupposed for any possibility of a 
critical judgment, is problematized by realizing how Shakespeare’s Hamlet as 
a tragedy is either a failure or, according to T. S. Eliot, at least defective. 
However, either a failure or defective, it has been realized by many radical 
critics –most notably Lionel Abel that, in context of allowing the premise that 
Shakespeare was trying to create a tragedy, what he actually ended achieving 
was a new dramatic form totally unprecedented8. 
One comparatively more recent example can be given from rather unusual 
side, that of practice of the art of pure mathematics. The rule-following here in 
context of axiomatized geometry or set theory is determined by the reasoned 
account of what it means for a particular mathematical practice to be pure 
demonstrative geometry or set theory. Extending rationalist aestheticians’ 
insights, the reasoned account on instrumental side here would involve the 
very axiomatization itself that would guaranty that all significantly relevant 
practical activity has been successfully and sufficiently captured. This would 
correlatively develop the holistic side as the statement of axiomatic geometry 
as-such. However, practical activity has been proved to possess a kind of 
ontological priority over any corresponding theoretic or epistemological 
capturing by providing anomalous precedents –for instance impossibility of 
proving parallel postulate from rest of the axioms and definitions of Euclidean 
Geometry demonstratively (or even constructively). Countless many ways to 
overcome the problem led to the discovery of non-Euclidean Geometries with 
their own respective rule-following (Marvin J. G. 2007) p. 210ff, 241ff, 376ff). 
Thus the paradox is already there in the very conception of the rule itself. The 
historical dimension of practice would mean that minor and sometimes major 
innovations on the practical side of an art or praxis can always alter the 
meaning of the object being determined or interpreted rendering a rigid 
                                                     
7 (Beiser, 2009, pp. 13-14) explains Gottsched’s position (as one of the representative 
German rationalist aesthetician) on the value of tragedy that follows from the corresponding 
rule-bounded aspect. Gottsched’s conceptualizing of this rule-boundness is primarily an 
extension of Christian Wolff’s position mentioned in the text above. See Ibid p. 208ff for the 
realization (primarily by Moses Mendelssohn within the rationalist legacy of Wolff) that 
experience of sublime is problematic to the presumed effect of tragedy conceived as the rule-
bounded aspect within rationalist tradition. 
8 T. S. Eliot regarded Shakespeare’s Hamlet a defective tragedy. For a detail of this 
and why it is not a tragedy as such, see (Abel, 1963, p. 40ff) 
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rationalist account of rule susceptible to an empiricist, positivist and a 
historicist critique.  
This helps one appreciate the role that both language and history has to 
offer in context of rule-following. The practical side resists itself being 
captured in terms of a corresponding necessary and sufficient condition as a 
rule, meaning that the declarative or informative aspect of language itself 
can’t match the ontological precedence of temporality of human action and 
thus the theory –as a coherent and consistent collection of propositions, is 
never a satisfactory answer to the problem of determining the meaning of any 
practice or phenomenon as a rule. The flipside of this is basically nothing but 
severing application –subsuming a particular under a universal, from the very 
genesis of the universal from a particular. For every rule –as conceived by the 
rationalists’ aesthetics, involves delineation of the practice into a proposition 
(or reasoned account). This amounts to the production of universal from 
particulars. Rule application would then involve nothing but subsuming a 
particular under a universal. Former was the task of the philosopher and the 
latter of the critic.  
This easily carries over to the universal problem of interpretation itself –
both as a practice or historical phenomenon. By universal problem of 
interpretation, I mean ‘how interpretation as-such is possible?’ Universal 
hermeneutics is what aims to answer the universal problem of interpretation9. 
Here, a ‘particular’ is a ‘particular interpretation according to a rule within a 
particular regional hermeneutics’. So, for instance, keeping the question of 
truth and evaluation aside, canons of classical Greek literature authenticated by 
the Alexandrian School of Classical Philology would be one such particular 
for universal hermeneutics. On the other hand, universal is the very principle 
with its associated or correlated schema which determines it (in context of its 
application) as such. This schema is not one of Kantian ‘determining 
judgment’ type, which Kant transcendentally founded to be the correction of 
rationalist conception of rule10. In fact, it is the Romanticized version of what 
                                                     
9 Universal in ‘Universal Hermeneutics’ primarily denotes the epistemological scope 
of hermeneutics in the sense of what has to answer the most primordial assumptions of any 
science in the sense that universal hermeneutics is what has to be presupposed if one wants to 
render the possibility of any science possible (in particular any human science). 
10 Kant was fully aware of the debate initiated from German rationalism (pioneered 
by Leibniz and followed by Wolff, Baumgarten, Gottsched, etc.) about the concept of rule 
following; see (Beiser, 2009) for detail, especially pp. 16ff, 64ff, 74ff and 87ff. Kant spoke of 
two kinds of judgments, (i) determining, (ii) reflective (Kant, Critique of the Powere of 
Judgment, 2000, pp. 26ff (20:223), 43ff (20:243)). Though he didn’t actually make such a 
distinction in his first Critique (i.e. Critique of Pure Reason) but the account in his later work 
of Critique of the Power of Judgment shows that what he called ‘determining judgment’ was 
in fact the kind that he was primarily after in his first Critique in context of what makes 
scientific theoretic judgment possible. Transcendental Schemata were the process that 
rendered it possible (Kant, 1998, pp. 268ff (A133-139/B172-178), 273 (A141/B181)). 
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makes the reflective judgment possible. According to Schleiermacher, it is the 
art or technique (Kunstlehre) which determines general rules, but its 
application is not rule bound11. This universal is then, as far as a concrete 
example is concerned, is not some concept which carries with it its schema as 
rule of application of Kantian type (like the Kantian concept of substance the 
particular modification of which in a singular proposition of ‘(a particular-) S 
is P’ carries with it the transcendental schema of Substance to which a 
particular empirical schema that helps identify ‘a particular object’ as what 
fulfils that singular proposition, is genetically attached)12. Continuing with the 
above example, a universal would then be determined by the very art or 
technique which both reflexively and reciprocally helped bring about those 
canons. The reciprocity and reflexivity is captured by the concept of 
hermeneutic circle13 which establishes this determination as correlative part-
whole structure (and process) of interpretive understanding and save us from 
falling into the pitfall of the problematic of: (a) either ‘subsume a particular 
under a universal’ or (b) ‘generate a universal from particular’, something that 
Kant found himself bogged-down with. This would make Alexandrian School 
of classical philology itself as the institutional embodiment of the very art or 
universal, the practice of which helped render those canons possible. Its rule-
bound aspect was regulatively determined by the methodological principle of 
analogy-anomaly but its corresponding application is not strictly rule-bound. 
The key between the canons and the corresponding art is the idea of 
hermeneutic circle. The regulative use of this very idea was captured in the 
dialectically engaged technical and grammatical aspects of his universal 
hermeneutics14.  
                                                     
11 (Schleiermacher, 1998, p. 11), see also (Schleiermacher cited in Rudolf Rӧssler’s 
‘A Short Account of Theological Study’ mentioned in (Bowie, 1997, p. 111)) for 
Schleiermacher’s conceptualizing of hermeneutics as that very art which theorizes this 
phenomenon of schematizing. 
12 See (Kant, 1998, pp. 273 (A140-141/B179-180)) for Kant’s notion of schema and 
schematization, and (Kant, 1998, p. 275 (A144/B183)) for the detail of ‘substance’ as 
transcendental schema –i.e. a particular modifications of time as intuition 
13  For the detail of what Schleiermacher means by hermeneutic circle, cf. 
(Schleiermacher, 1998, pp. 24, 27, 70). It corresponds to the structure of interpretive 
understanding in which an object (an utterance or text) is understood as movement between 
the whole (constituted by the context) and the part (the very object as-belonging to that 
context). It gives an alternative to a formalized theory of semantics as pioneered by Frege, 
Russell and Wittgenstein. On the other hand, how this whole-part can also be considered as the 
hermeneutic correlation between universal-particular, see Schleiermacher cited in (Bowie, 
1997, p. 123) 
14 This paper does not aim to elaborate on the practical and methodological details of 
Schleiermacher’s universal hermeneutics. For the detail of how this hermeneutics is 
correlatively dichotomized into psychological or technical and grammatical, I would refer the 
reader to the original source itself; cf. (Schleiermacher, 1998, pp. 9, 11, 23, 93, 128, 140, 228-
235). 
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Thus, Schleiermacher starts where Kant and his Romantic adversaries had 
left. Schleiermacher gave his general account of how such schematizations of 
experiences occur as linguistic rule-acquisitions and rule-following during the 
process of learning and using a language. Its model determination is expressed 
in the arts (Kunstlehre) which express them institutionally. According to this, 
an experience of learning and using a language provides the model example of 
how this art or universal is both acquired and used15. This was also the solution 
to the problematics of Kant’s transcendental doctrine of schematism. Since 
schemata were considered to be responsible for rendering the possibility of 
judgment. They transcendentally constituted the rule-boundness of the very act 
of understanding as the faculty of pure reason. But Kant was not able to 
explain the ground of its application. According to him, it was an art hidden 
deep in our souls16. Thus Kant’s account of schematism was a dead end for the 
whole critical project. On the other hand, Schleiermacher realized that the 
ability to sustain identity through difference is directly related with the ability 
of using a finite vocabulary to make sense of the world from an indefinite 
differentiation (Schleiermacher, 1998, p. 271ff). Since schemata or general 
images of particulars are responsible for what hold the identity among 
differences of particulars (different triangles unified under the concept of 
‘isosceles triangles’), same is the case with our ability to use a word in its 
corresponding designation. Thus language as the system of designation holds 
the key in solving the problem of schematization. Both schema and word 
correlate. Since successful use of the word depends upon our ability to have 
first acquired and then used the language, and since this language is what 
reflexively and historically determined by these arts17, implies that it is not the 
transcendental account that solves the problem of schematization but language 
itself as system of designation is the solution, for the learning and using the 
language involves the rules and it is these rules which are the hermeneutic 
counterpart part of what schematize experiences (and thus corrective of Kant’s 
transcendental schematism). This makes Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics as the 
very explication of the art that Kant thought to be hidden deep in our souls. 
Thus language becomes the horizon which delineates the place for 
occurrences of interpretive understanding such that this interpretive 
understanding consists of the art with general rules (without absolute 
algorithmic rule-bound applicability) to the extent that such an art has its 
genetic origin in the very emergence or historical development of language 
through gifted or talented geniuses.  Again, continuing with our example of 
                                                     
15 See ibid p. 271ff for how rules are acquired and used in equivalence with how one 
learns a language and use it. It is very much like acculturation of a child. There, rules are the 
norms of the culture. 
16 (Kant, 1998, p. 273 (A141/B180)) 
17 One manifestation of how this is the case can be given by the observation of how 
much of the Shakespeare’s dialogues have become part of ordinary English  
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Alexandrian philology, one modification of ‘historical development of 
language’ corresponds to the regulative determination of Greek literature 
through the works of Greek poetry with Hesiod and Homer being the 
corresponding gifted geniuses on the historical developmental side. 
 
3. Conclusions 
Schleiermacher’s universal hermeneutics can thus be considered as a way 
out of the problematics of rule-following. Instead of grounding the possibility 
of judgment and intelligibility of the world; either in rationalist account of rule 
or Kant’s transcendental schematism (the doctrine of the process by virtue of 
which transcendental schemata are responsible for rendering the scientific 
intelligibility of the world), he sought this in the arts or techniques by virtue of 
which language manifest itself as horizon of interpretive understanding. Thus, 
arts or techniques (e.g. regional hermeneutic practices, narratology, poetics, 
rhetoric, etc.) are for Schleiermacher the hermeneutic corrective of Kant’s 
transcendental schemata with hermeneutic circle replacing any rationalist or 
transcendental deduction inspired by Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. 
The end result is the possibility of understanding human historical actions 
which are non-positivists and still provide the possibility of criticism. The 
possibility of criticism is provided by another art that has the ability to make 
the rest of the arts (as hermeneutic corrective of rules) its object of 
investigation. This art is Schleiermacher’s Universal Hermeneutics; for it is 
here that this possibility of second order reference is established. Thus, it can 
be conjectured here that, this may help in correcting the naïve positivistic 
presumptions in most of the modern empirically based modern research 
methodologies in the domain of human sciences; for these methodologies take 
both the ability of their own language and consciousness to refer their object of 
investigation transparent and trustworthy in building up of a theory, which we 
have already found to be dubious in context of the problematics of rule-
following. This is the case since almost none of the positivistically led research 
questions the possibility of this ability.  
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